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This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first two chapters provide em-
pirical evidence of hot-hand bias in two novel field settings: dart players’ strategic
choices, and physicians’ decisions during childbirth. The “hot hand” refers to the
notion that a person can enter a state in which her probability of success becomes
higher than normal. Regardless of whether the person actually has a hot hand, the
“hot-hand bias” is when the person has an exaggerated belief about the hot hand.
In Chapter 1, I collect data of professional dart players from the 2016 World Darts
Championship. I find that players are significantly more likely to hit after a success-
ful shot, implying that players have a hot hand. Based on a precise estimate of the
hot hand, I calculate the optimal strategy of a profit-maximizing dart player. I find
that dart players are much more willing to take risks after a successful shot than
what I calculate to be optimal, consistent with hot-hand bias.
In Chapter 2, I utilize 1.3 million hospital admissions for childbirth in New York
State over 2010-2015. I find no evidence that physicians have a hot hand when
performing obstetrical procedures. In the absence of hot hand, physicians are still
2% more likely to perform a C-section after a previous successful C-section. My
empirical model includes physician fixed effects and a large set of patient conditions
that proxy for when a C-section is likely to maximize patient welfare. Robustness
checks provide additional evidence consistent with decision-makers having hot-hand
bias. Assuming that the identified 2% increase in the C-section rate is unwarranted,
the estimated health-care cost is $65 million per year in the US.
Chapter 3 is joint work with Nicolas Ziebarth. We investigate the relationship
between sleep and health using a census of 160 million hospital admissions from
Germany and 3.4 million survey responses from the US over one decade. We exploit
the exogenous extension of sleep when daylight saving time ends: setting clocks back
by one hour in the fall significantly extends night’s sleep and reduces self-reported
tiredness for four days following the time shift. In turn, we find that self-reported
health improves and hospital admissions decrease significantly for about four days.
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Chapter 1
Don’t Overshoot: Evidence of
Hot-Hand Bias from World Darts
Championship
1.1 Introduction
There is a widespread belief that athletes have “hot hands,” i.e. they can some-
times enter a “hot” state in which the probability of success becomes higher than
normal. Earlier evidence has suggested that the hot hand is a fallacy, based on
empirical evidence that performance outcomes appear not to be serially correlated
(Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky, 1985).1 However, recent studies have found signifi-
cant evidence of hot hand in sports upon correcting for a statistical bias in previous
1Raab, Gula, and Gigerenzer (2012) provide a review of the hot-hand literature in sports.
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measures of conditional probabilities (Miller and Sanjurjo, 2015) and after control-
ling for endogenous responses of opponents (Green and Zwiebel, 2017; Miller and
Sanjurjo, 2014).
In the presence of hot hand, it is challenging to test whether people have correct
perception of the hot hand. Camerer (1989) studies the sports betting market and
finds that people overbet on teams that are on a winning streak. This is consis-
tent with “hot-hand bias,” i.e. an exaggerated belief in the hot hand. The stakes
would potentially be higher if athletes themselves are subject to the hot-hand bias,
which can distort their behavior during the game. Green and Zwiebel (2017) find
that professional baseball pitchers overreact to batters who have been hot in their
previous five at-bats, and walk them more than can be justified by the batters’ true
performance.
This paper provides first field evidence of professional athletes overreacting to
their own hot hand. Specifically, I study professional dart players’ performances
during a large international tournament. A dart player chooses from several possible
targets on the dart board, each with varying risks and rewards. Where their shots
land reveal whether they chose a risky strategy or a safe one. Because the goal of the
game is to hit as many points as possible (in the early game), I can calculate the point-
maximizing optimal strategy based on the players’ true hot hand. By comparing
the players’ strategies to the calculated optimal strategy, I can test whether they
overshoot when hot, which would be consistent with hot-hand bias.
The data are collected from the 2016 World Darts Championship, where the
world’s best dart players competed for a total prize pool of £1.5 million (US $2
2
million). First, I find that professional dart players have a large hot hand. After
a previous successful hit, players are 18% more likely to hit the intended target
again (p < 0.001). Next, I test whether the players have correct perception of their
hot hand. I calculate the point-maximizing optimal target choices based on the
players’ true hot-hand magnitudes. Compared to the calculated optimal strategy, I
find that players are 8% more risk-taking after a previous success (p < 0.001). The
evidence suggests that professional dart players suffer from significant hot-hand bias.
Robustness checks rule out alternative explanations, such as a possible tendency for
players to become more risk-taking when they are ahead in the game. The cost of
this strategic error is large, at about $960 per match in lost earnings.
This paper is one of the first studies to show that the hot-hand bias distorts
behavior in an economically significant way. This has traditionally been one of
the challenges of the hot-hand literature. For example, the forecasting error due
to hot-hand bias in the basketball betting market is only slight (Camerer, 1989).
In the study by Green and Zwiebel (2017), it is hard to check whether or not a
pitcher’s overrection to the batters’ hot hand incurs a tangible cost to the team’s
performance. In baseball, there are too many factors that can counteract a pitcher’s
mistake, such as referees being more generous to the pitcher after a walk. Finally,
studies have shown consistent evidence of hot-hand bias among gamblers, such as
when playing the roulette in casinos (Croson and Sundali, 2005), buying lotteries
from “lucky stores” (Guryan and Kearney, 2008), and picking lottery numbers that
have won frequently in the recent past (Suetens, Galbo-Jørgensen, and Tyran, 2015).
However, these “mistakes” are not costly because the outcomes are random and
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therefore independent of the gambler’s decisions.2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides details about the game
and the data, and Section 1.3 describes the empirical framework. The results are
presented in Section 1.4 and Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Details and the Data
Darts is a two-player game, and each player starts a leg with 501 points. Players take
turns to throw three darts in successsion, and the three darts are removed from the
board only after the turn is over. The dart board is split into 20 areas, each with a
number between 1 and 20 (Figure 1.2.1). This is the baseline number of points that
a player will receive by hitting the area with a dart. In addition, there are two rings
on the board that will either double or triple the baseline points. The red circle in
the middle is the Bull’s Eye, worth 50 points, and the green area surrounding it is
worth 25 points. The maximum points attainable with a shot is 60 points, by hitting
a Triple-20 (“60” henceforth). The next highest target is a Triple-19 (“57”), followed
by a Triple-18 (“54”).
The goal of the game is to accumulate exactly 501 points before the opponent
does, bringing one’s score down from 501 to zero. The last throw has to be a Double
or a Bull’s Eye. If a player hits more points than required to reach zero, the player
“busts” and the score returns to the score at the start of that turn. A set is won
when a player wins three legs, and the match is won by the first player to win three
2Suetens, Galbo-Jørgensen, and Tyran (2015) find that picking “hot” lottery numbers actually
incurs a small cost because more people tend to pick these numbers, so when they win, they have
to split the winnings across more people.
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Figure 1.2.1: Dart Board
(round 1), four (rounds 2 & 3), five (quarterfinals), six (semifinals), or seven (final)
sets.
The optimal strategy is to first try and hit as many points as possible to bring
the score down quickly. As the score approaches zero, players must then consider the
optimal paths to “close out” the game. To eliminate the complexities of the endgame,
I restrict the sample to the first nine throws of a leg, where players unambiguously
try to hit as many points as possible.
The data are from the 2016 World Darts Championship, which is a prestigious
international darts tournament held annually in London. The tournament began in
December 17, 2015 and concluded in January 3, 2016. The total prize pool was £1.5
million (US $1.97 million), with £300,000 ($394,000) given to the eventual champion
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Gary Anderson.3
Four research assistants were recruited to watch 31 tournament videos on Youtube,
starting from Round 2 to the Grand Final. Using a computer program, the research
assistants recorded the coordinates of 21,188 shots played by 32 players in the tour-
nament. After restricting the sample to the first nine shots of a leg, the final sample
size is 11,810 shots.
Figure 1.2.2 shows a heat map of the sample. 82% of shots landed near 60, and
these are coded as being aimed at 60. 15% of shots landed near 57, 3% landed near
54, and the remaining 1% of darts are scattered around 51 and the Bull’s Eye. The
intended target of a shot is determined by the closest distance to the following five
targets: 60, 57, 54, 51, and 50.
Table 1.1 shows summary statistics. On average, players hit the intended target
41% of the time. The hit rate is slightly lower at the start of a turn, at 36%, but the
hit rate improves for the 2nd and 3rd shots of a turn. This may be because the first
shot is made after a short break while the opponent completes his turn.
Players are significantly more likely to hit after a hit, compared to after a miss
(46% vs 37%, p < 0.01), consistent with players having a hot hand. This difference
is not significant when restricted to the first shots of a turn, suggesting that a time
delay between turns might be eliminating the hot hand. However, there are strong
indications that hot hand exists when we look at 2nd and 3rd shots of a turn.
On average, 82% of the shots in my sample are aimed at target 60. The first shots
of a turn are almost always aimed at 60, but the frequency drops to 79% among 2nd
3The exchange rates as of November 10, 2017
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Figure 1.2.2: Heat Map
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics (Darts)
Mean HITt−1 = 0 HITt−1 = 1 p-value
Hit 0.41 0.37 0.46 < 0.01
1st Shot 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.11
2nd Shot 0.42 0.38 0.50 < 0.01
3rd Shot 0.44 0.38 0.51 < 0.01
Shoot at 60 0.82 0.77 0.89 < 0.01
1st Shot 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.39
2nd Shot 0.79 0.70 0.93 < 0.01
3rd Shot 0.67 0.61 0.75 < 0.01
# Players 32
# Matches 31
# Shots 11,810
Notes: This table presents summary statistics of the darts data collected from the 2016 World Darts
Championship. The data include 31 matches from Round 2 to the Grand Final.
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shots, and to 70% for 3rd shots. This is because after the player shoots at 60, the dart
remains on the board and partially blocks the target, making it slightly harder to hit
60 again. We also see that players are much more risk-taking after a previous hit. For
the 2nd shot, players will almost always attempt a 60 again after a hit, significantly
more than if the prior shot was a miss (93% vs 72%, p < 0.01). Similarly, for the
3rd shot, players shoot at 60 77% of the time after a hit, compared to 64% after
a miss (p < 0.01). The results are qualitatively consistent with an expected payoff
maximizer: when a player has made a previous shot, he is more likely to hit the
target again, and therefore should attempt the risky shot more often.
1.3 Empirical Framework and Theory
1.3.1 Testing the Hot Hand
The general empirical specification for testing the hot hand is shown below:
Si,t = α0 + α1Si,t−1 + α2Xi,t + i,t
Si,t is an indicator for a successful outcome by decision-maker i’s performance at
time t. In darts, the success is defined as whether a player’s shot has hit the intended
target. Xi,t is a vector of control variables that need to ensure that the explanatory
variable, Si,t−1, is conditionally random.
α1 is interpreted as the change in probability of success when the decision-maker
has previously succeeded. α1 > 0 is evidence in favor of the existence of a hot hand.
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α1 = 0 would imply that there is no hot hand. α1 < 0 implies outcome reversals,
where the chance of success decreases following a previous success.4
1.3.2 Testing the Hot-Hand Bias
Dart players have an objective to try and hit as many points as possible (in my
analysis sample; see Section 1.2). This means a player’s decision to choose a particu-
lar target, say 60, should only depend on its expected payoff (i.e. number of points)
relative to the next-best option. For example, in a world without measurement error,
the player would choose 60 if and only if the expected payoff of choosing 60 is higher
than the next-best option. With measurement error, the player should still respond
positively to the expected payoff of 60 relative to other options.
The key idea is that if players are rational agents who want to maximize the
chance of winning the match, their decision to choose 60 should only depend on
the expected payoff of 60 relative to the next-best option. Put differently, after
controlling for the relative expected payoff of 60, the players’ decision to choose 60
should no longer be influenced by other factors such as a prior success. If the decision
is positively (negatively) affected by the prior success, it suggests an overreaction
(underreaction) to the hot hand.
I begin with a simple model of a dart player. Let i index the player, j index the
possible targets on the board, and s index the state of the world. Player i’s utility
of choosing target j in state s is given by the expected payoff of chooding target j
conditional on state s, denoted by Vi,j,s, and an unobserved error term:
4One possible explanation is that the decision-maker puts less effort after a previous success.
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Ui,j,s = Vi,j,s + i,j,s
The player chooses a target that maximizes the utility, as shown:
Ui,j,s ≥ Ui,k,s,∀k 6= j
The expected payoff of choosing a target is approximated by the observed average
number of points scored by the players when they chose that target conditional on
the observable state of the world. In the baseline specification, I consider 2 possible
targets (60 or 57), and 48 possible states of the world for each target, as shown:
Uˆi,j,s = σj,h1,a1,h2,a2,n
Uˆi,j,s denotes the expected payoff (or utility) of player i choosing target j in state
s. j denotes two possible targets, 60 or 57. The reason for considering only two
possible targets is that there are not enough observations of players choosing targets
other than 60 and 57. h1 denotes a “hot” state of the player, defined to be 1 if the
previous shot was a success, and 0 otherwise. a1 is an indicator for whether the
previous shot was aimed at 60 or not. I also consider h2 and a2 that correspond
to whether two shots ago was a success, and whether that shot was aimed at 60,
respectively. Finally, n denotes the three possible stages of a turn: 1st shot, 2nd
shot, or 3rd shot.
This generates 96 possible expected payoffs: 2 possible targets in 48 possible
states of the world (2 (j) x 2 (h1) x 2 (a1) x 2 (h2) x 2 (a2) x 3 (n)).
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What matters when choosing a target is its expected payoff relative to the second-
best option. Let Xˆi,j,s denote the relative expected payoff of choosing target j in state
s, obtained by subtracting the estimated expected payoff of the next best option
k 6= j, as shown:
Xˆi,j,s = Uˆi,j,h − Uˆi,k,h
A rational agent’s decision to choose the risky target of 60 would be determined
by its relative expected payoff. I therefore estimate the following OLS:
Yi,t = σi + β1Xˆi,t + β2Hiti,t−1 + i,t
Yi,t is the decision variable that equals 1 if player i chooses target 60 at time t.
Xˆi,t is the relative expected payoff of target 60 at time t estimated in the first-stage.
Because it is estimated by conditioning on a previous success, it incorporates the
benefits of having a hot hand that makes 60 a more attractive target. Hiti,t−1 is an
empirical proxy for being in a hot state, defined to be 1 if the previous shot at t− 1
was a successful hit. The standard errors are clustered at the player level.
β2 is the coefficient of interest, and it is interpreted as the change in probability
of choosing target 60 when the player has previously hit, conditional on the relative
expected payoff of 60. β2 = 0 would be consistent with a rational expected-payoff
maximizer. On the other hand, β2 < 0 would be consistent with players underreact-
ing to having a hot hand, and β2 > 0 might suggest an overreaction.
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Table 1.2: Test for the Hot-Hand (Darts)
(1) (2)
DV = Hit DV = Points Scored
Hitt−1 0.075*** 3.365***
(0.010) (0.427)
Player fixed effects Y Y
Constant 0.384*** 33.750***
(0.004) (0.173)
Obs 11,810 11,810
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hitt−1 is an indicator that equals 1 if the dart player’s
previous shot has hit the intended target. In Column 1, the dependent variable is whether the
current shot has hit the intended target. The regression tests whether a previous hit is predictive
of current hit, which would indicate that professional dart players have a hot hand. In Column 2,
the dependent variable is the number of points that a player has scored with the current shot. The
regression tests whether a previous hit improves the average number of points that a player scores
with the current shot. Standard errors are clustered at the player level.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Test for the Hot Hand
There is strong evidence that hot hand exists in professional darts performances.
In Table 1.2, Column 1, I find that the probability of hitting the intended target
improves by 7.5 percentage points (ppt) following a successful hit (p < 0.001). This
is an 18% improvement over the average hit rate of 41%. Column 2 shows that, on
average, players score 3.4 more points when in a hot state. The results show that,
indeed, the hot hand is not a fallacy, consistent with recent evidence from professional
basketball and baseball (Miller and Sanjurjo, 2014, 2015; Green and Zwiebel, 2017).
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Table 1.3: Test for the Hot-Hand Bias (Darts)
Dep Var = Shoot at 60 (1) (2) (3)
Hitt−1 0.140*** 0.065*** 0.066***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
Xˆi,t: The relative expected payoff of 60 0.019*** 0.002*
(0.002) (0.001)
Indicator: 60 has the highest expected payoff 0.447***
(0.037)
Player fixed effects Y Y Y
Constant 0.731*** 0.712*** 0.381***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.034)
Obs 11,810 11,810 11,810
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table tests whether the decision to choose the
maximum-possible target is related to having a hot hand. The dependent variable is an indicator
that equals 1 if the player shoots at the maximum-possible target of 60. Hitt−1 is an indicator for
whether the dart player’s previous shot has hit the intended target, which is a proxy for having a
hot hand. Xˆi,t is the estimated expected payoff of target 60, minus the estimated expected payoff
of the next-highest target of 57, based on the current state of the world (including whether the
player is in a hot state or not). Column 3 also includes an indicator that equals 1 if Xˆi,t > 0, i.e. if
target 60 is calculated to be the optimal choice. Standard errors are clustered at the player level.
1.4.2 Test for the Hot-Hand Bias
Table 1.3 shows the estimated effects of a previous hit on the players’ decision to
choose target 60. In Column 1, without controlling for the relative expected payoffs,
players are 14 ppts more likely to choose target 60 after a successful hit. This is
qualitatively consistent with what a rational agent would do. Since having a hot
hand significantly increases the probability of making the next shot, it would be
payoff-maximizing to choose the high-reward target more often.
In Column 2, I control for the relative expected payoff of target 60, which in-
corporates the payoff benefits of having a hot hand. A five-point increase in the
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relative expected payoff of 60 increases the likelihood of choosing 60 by 9.5 ppts
(p < 0.001). The fact that the point estimate is positive and significant suggests
that players are, in general, responding to the expected payoffs. However, they still
respond significantly to a previous success. The new point estimate is smaller, at 6.5
ppts (p < 0.001). The fact that it is smaller implies that much of the large response
found in Column 1 is due to the payoff benefits of having a hot hand. The new
estimate is still significantly positive, suggesting that players are overshooting when
they are hot.
Column 3 includes an indicator that equals 1 if target 60 has the highest expected
payoff, that is, 60 is calculated to be the optimal choice. Players are 45 ppts more
likely to choose 60 when 60 is calculated to be optimal (p < 0.001). There is now only
a marginally significant positive response to the relative expected payoff of 60. Again,
evidence suggests that players are generally payoff-maximizing. The coefficient for
hot-hand bias remains significant at 6.6 ppts (p < 0.001). Taken together, the results
suggest that players are much too risk-taking after a previous success than what I
calculate to be optimum.
The regression estimates from Table 1.3 show the difference in risk-taking behav-
ior between having made the previous shot compared to having missed the previous
shot. The estimates suggest that this difference is larger than what I calculate to
be optimum, but these estimates do not reveal when players are making mistakes.
That is, are players making mistakes when they are “hot”, or when they are “cold”,
or both?
Table 1.4 compares the observed versus optimal frequencies of choosing target
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Table 1.4: Comparison Between Observed and Optimal Strategy (Darts)
Cold (Hitt−1 = 0) Hot (Hitt−1 = 1)
Observed Optimal Observed Optimal
Frequency of 60 (%) Frequency of 60 Frequency of 60 Frequency of 60
1st Shot 96.8 100 97.1 100
2nd Shot 70.4 74.2 93.1 97.9
3rd Shot 61.1 78.6 74.6 79.5
Notes: This table compares the observed frequency of players choosing the maximum-possible target
60 vs. the calculated optimal frequency of choosing 60, when the player is hot or cold, and across
the three stages of a turn.
60, across two dimensions: whether or not a player has a hot hand, and the nth
shot of a turn. Interestingly, when players have a hot hand, they seem to be making
choices that are generally consistent with what I calculate to be optimal. However,
when a player has previous missed a shot, they seem to be appropriately risk-taking
for the first two shots of a turn, but are not choosing 60 frequently enough for the
3rd shots. This perhaps suggests a cold-hand bias: after missing the previous shot,
players underestimate their ability to hit the risky target, and as a result turn to
lower-reward targets too often.5
1.4.3 Robustness Checks and Heterogeneity
In this section I consider a few alternative explanations of the results. I then test for
heterogeneity of the hot hand and hot-hand bias across players.
When a player has successfully hit the previous shot, the player is in a better
state of the game than if the previous shot was unsuccessful. It is therefore possible
5One may wonder if players are too conservative at the baseline, and have exaggerated hot hand
beliefs after making a successful shot. This appears to be inconsistent with the evidence. For
example, looking at the first shots of a turn in Table 4, players appear to be choosing the risky
target 97% of the time even after having missed the previous shot.
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that a response to a previous success is driven not by the hot-hand bias, but instead
by a tendency to become more risk-taking when the player is ahead in the game.
In Table 1.5, Column 1 replicates the main results (Table 1.4, Column 3). In
Column 2, I include the score difference, that is, the player’s current score minus
the opponent’s score. A negative coefficient suggests that players are in fact less
risk-taking when they are ahead. Being ahead by 100 points is associated with a 3
ppt decrease in the frequency of shooting at target 60 (p < 0.001). After controlling
for the score difference, the estimated hot hand response is 7.6 ppts (p < 0.001).
Another potential concern is that a response to a previous success may be driven
by the players’ desire to hit a maximum of 180 points in a turn. The crowd cheers
and the commentators go wild when a player hits three 60’s in a row in a turn. In
Column 3, I include an indicator that equals 1 if the player is facing the 3rd shot of
a turn and his two previous shots have each hit 60. Players are 2.2 ppts more likely
to aim at 60 again (p = 0.098). The point estimate for the hot-hand bias is 6.3 ppts
(p < 0.001). Finally, Column 4 includes both control variables, and players are still
more risk-taking after a successful shot than what is calculated to be optimal.
Figure 1.4.1 shows player-specific estimates of the hot hand for the 32 players
in the sample. The players are ordered by their world rankings at the time of the
tournament, starting with the world’s best player, van Gerwen, on the left, and the
lowest ranked van de Bergh (60th in the world) on the right. The blue bars show
the estimated hot hand for each player, with 95% confidence intervals and a linear
trend (dotted line). Note that the confidence intervals are generally larger for lower-
ranked players on the right because they tend to drop out earlier in the tournament
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Table 1.5: Robustness Checks (Darts)
Dep Var = Shoot at 60 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Hitt−1 0.066*** 0.076*** 0.063*** 0.072***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Score difference with opponent (x 100) -0.030*** -0.031***
(0.004) (0.014)
Chance for 180 0.022* 0.040***
(0.013) (0.014)
Xˆi,t: The relative expected 0.002* 0.004*** 0.002* 0.003**
payoff of 60 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Indicator: 60 has the highest 0.447*** 0.440*** 0.447*** 0.440***
expected payoff (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
Player fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Constant 0.381*** 0.385*** 0.381*** 0.385***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Obs 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table provides robustness checks to test if the
identifed behavioral response is consistent with dart players having a hot-hand bias. The dependent
variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the player shoots at the maximum-possible target of 60.
Hitt−1 is an indicator for whether the dart player’s previous shot has hit the intended target, which
is a proxy for having a hot hand. Xˆi,t is the estimated expected payoff of target 60, minus the
estimated expected payoff of the next-highest target of 57, based on the current state of the world
(including whether the player is in a hot state or not). All columns also include an indicator that
equals 1 if Xˆi,t > 0, i.e. if target 60 is calculated to be the optimal choice. Column 2 tests whether
the behavioral response to a previous hit can be explained by being ahead or behind in the game,
and includes the player’s score minus the opponent’s score. Column 3 tests whether the behavioral
response to a previous hit can be explained by a desire to score a perfect 180 points in a turn. The
model includes a dummy that equals 1 if the player is facing a third shot of a turn, and having hit
120 points with the previous two shots. Standard errors are clustered at the player level.
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Figure 1.4.1: Player-Specific Hot-Hands
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Figure 1.4.2: Player-Specific Hot-Hand Bias
and as a result have fewer observations. 29 out of 32 players have positive hot hand
estimates, 11 of which are statistically significant at the 5% level. Only three players
exhibit a negative hot hand, none significant at the 5% level. There appears to be
no particular trend across the players’ ranks.
Figure 1.4.2 shows player-specific estimates of hot-hand bias, using a specification
similar to Column 3 of Table 1.3. The 95% confidence intervals are also shown. 25
players have positive hot-hand bias, 13 of which are significant at the 5% level.
None of the estimates are significantly negative. The dotted line shows a slightly
increasing linear trend, which is not significant (p = 0.19). If true, an increasing
trend would imply that better players are less biased. Overall, the estimated hot-
hand bias appears to be prevalent across most players.
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper provides one of the first field evidence of hot-hand bias among professional
athletes. Looking at the performance of professional dart players during a large
international tournament, I find evidence of a large performance momentum – players
are significantly more likely to be successful when their previous shot was a success.
This is consistent with recent findings that significant hot hands exist in sports
(Miller and Sanjurjo, 2014, 2015; Green and Zwiebel, 2017). Moreover, I find strong
evidence that the majority of players misperceive their own hot hand – they are
much too risk-taking when hot, consistent with hot-hand bias. This new evidence
complements Green and Zwiebel (2017)’s findings that professional baseball pitchers
tend to overreact to the opponent’ most recent performances.
The hot-hand bias turns out to be costly in the sport of darts. Compared to
a rational agent with correct perception of the hot hand, a biased player hits 0.57
fewer point per shot on average, or about 5.1 fewer points over the first nine shots. I
estimate that this reduces the player’s chance of winning the match by 1.4 percentage
points, which translates to a $960 loss in prize earnings per match.
In the next chapter, I explore hot-hand bias in a medical setting. Specifically, I
study physicians’ treatment decisions during childbirth. I test whether a physician is
more likely to choose C-section for a patient if the physician had previously performed
a C-section successfully, which would be consistent with a belief in the hot hand of
performing the surgery.
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Chapter 2
Evidence of Hot-Hand Bias in
Medical Decision-Making
2.1 Introduction
Estimates suggest that as much as $210 billion is wastefully spent on unnecessary
medical treatments and services in the United States (McGinnis, Stuckhardt, Saun-
ders, Smith, et al., 2013). In a survey conducted in 2009, 42% of primary-care physi-
cians report that their patients receive too much care, in contrast to only 6% who
said patients receive too little (Sirovich, Woloshin, and Schwartz, 2011). This paper
focuses on a new concern stemming from the field of behavioral economics: the role
of cognitive biases in physician decision-making. Specifically, this paper conducts
an empirical investigation into the effects of hot-hand bias in the decision-making of
obstetricians.
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The “hot hand” refers to the notion that a person can enter a “hot” state in which
her probability of success becomes higher than normal. For example, basketball
players and fans believe that a player’s chance of hitting a shot is greater following a
hit than following a miss (Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky, 1985). That is, a previous
success is considered to be indicative of the player being in a hot state, and as a result
people believe that the player has a higher chance of making the next shot. The “hot-
hand bias” is when a person has exaggerated beliefs about the size of the hot hand.
Studies have shown consistent evidence of hot-hand bias across a number of settings,
for example in professional baseball where players have large hot hands (Green and
Zwiebel, 2017) and even in gambling situations where hot hands clearly cannot exist
because outcomes are known to be independent and identically distributed (Croson
and Sundali, 2005; Guryan and Kearney, 2008; Suetens, Galbo-Jørgensen, and Tyran,
2015).
This paper uses micro-level data on childbirth to empirically test whether physi-
cians have hot-hand bias when making treatment decisions. In childbirth, physicians
must decide whether or not to perform a C-section on the patient. A physician who
suffers from the hot-hand bias may, after having previously performed a C-section
successfully, overestimate the likelihood of performing a successful C-section again.
As a result, she may become more likely to choose C-section to the next patient than
what is medically optimal for the patient.
I use administrative hospital discharge data for 1.3 million births in New York
State over 2010-2015. First, I find no evidence that physicians have a hot hand when
performing obstetrical procedures. In the absence of hot hand, physicians are still
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2% more likely to perform a C-section after a previous successful C-section. The
estimated effect is small but statistically significant (p = 0.02). My empirical model
includes physician fixed effects, and a large set of patient conditions that proxy for
when a C-section is likely to maximize patient welfare. Robustness checks provide
additional evidence consistent with decision-makers having a hot-hand bias. The
identified increase in C-section rate is not persistent, which is inconsistent with other
explanations such as Bayesian learning process or malpractice fears. Generalizing the
findings to the United States and assuming that the identified 2% increase in the
C-section rate is unwarranted, the estimated health-care cost is $65 million per year.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on the role of cognitive biases in
physician decision-making (e.g. Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Blumenthal-Barby and
Krieger, 2015; Khullar, Chokshi, Kocher, Reddy, Basu, Conway, and Rajkumar, 2015;
Emanuel, Ubel, Kessler, Meyer, Muller, Navathe, Patel, Pearl, Rosenthal, Sacks,
et al., 2016). It also contributes to the discussion of health-care overutilization in ob-
stetrics, where health economics studies have explored the role of physician-induced
demand (e.g. Gruber and Owings, 1996; Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin, 1999; John-
son and Rehavi, 2016) and defensive medicine related to malpractice concerns (e.g.
Dubay, Kaestner, and Waidmann, 1999; Currie and MacLeod, 2008; Shurtz, 2013).
Finally, the empirical approach of this paper is motivated by studies on decision-
making under the gambler’s fallacy (Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue, 2016; Rabin and
Vayanos, 2010; Suetens, Galbo-Jørgensen, and Tyran, 2015).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data, and Section
2.3 details the empirical specification. The results are presented in Section 2.4, and
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Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Details and the Data
Childbirth can be performed vaginally or by a C-section. The C-section is a ma-
jor abdominal surgery intended for the delivery of high-risk childbirths in which a
vaginal delivery would put the baby or the mother at risk. Both the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG) recommend that a C-section should only be performed when medically nec-
essary (Caughey, Cahill, Guise, Rouse, of Obstetricians, Gynecologists, et al., 2014;
Betran, Torloni, Zhang, and Gu¨lmezoglu, 2016). A C-section is $6,000 more expen-
sive than vaginal births (Baicker, Buckles, and Chandra, 2006), and it is associated
with an overall increase in poor outcomes for most pregnancies that are not high risk
(Caughey, Cahill, Guise, Rouse, of Obstetricians, Gynecologists, et al., 2014).
In the U.S., the decision to perform a C-section is typically made by the physician,
although mothers can also request the delivery method. There are several patient
conditions that increase the risk of a C-section. C-sections are usually scheduled
if the mother has a history of previous C-section, and about 90% end up receiving
the surgery, even though many may benefit from first trying vaginal births after
C-section (VBAC) (Caughey, Cahill, Guise, Rouse, of Obstetricians, Gynecologists,
et al., 2014; Arnold and Flint, 2017). There are also important medical conditions
that increase the chance of receiving a C-section, including a twin (or multiple)
birth, problems with the placenta or the umbilical cord, obstructed labor, and breech
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position. The C-section may either be scheduled ahead of time, or performed after
an initial attempt of vaginal delivery.
There is a concern in the medical community that C-sections may be overused.
The C-section rate has increased rapidly in the U.S. over the past 20 years, from 21%
in 1995 to 32% in 2015 (Martin, Hamilton, Osterman, Driscoll, and Mathews, 2017).
Studies suggest that overall birth outcomes do not improve beyond a C-section rate of
about 20% (Gibbons, Beliza´n, Lauer, Betra´n, Merialdi, Althabe, et al., 2010; Molina,
Weiser, Lipsitz, Esquivel, Uribe-Leitz, Azad, Shah, Semrau, Berry, Gawande, et al.,
2015). Perhaps more concerning is a large variation in C-section rates for low-risk
births across hospitals, ranging from 7% to as high as 51% among major hospitals
(Haelle, 2016). These numbers suggest a high level of discretion in performing C-
sections.
The data set is provided by the Statewide Planning and Research Cooperative
System (SPARCS) of New York. The data include all hospital admissions that
occurred in the state of New York for the years 2010-2015, and contain a rich set
of variables about the patient and the medical procedures performed during the
admission.1 I restrict the data to hospital admissions for childbirth, and then further
restrict the sample to physicians who have performed at least one C-section and one
vaginal delivery in the six-year period. The final analysis sample includes 1.3 million
births in New York delivered by 3,725 physicians.2
1A complete list of variables is available at: https://www.health.ny.gov/statistics/sparcs/datadic.htm
2Prior to the New York data, I obtained a similar hospital discharge data from New Hampshire
over 2010-2015. The data were provided by the Department of Health and Human Services of New
Hampshire, and the analysis sample included 31,845 births delivered by 195 physicians. The results
for New Hampshire is available in the Appendix.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Childbirth in New York State
Frequency (%)
C-section rate 34.2
Any major complication 12.7
Maternal complication 6.1
Fetal complication 7.1
Patient Characteristics Frequency (%) % Receive C-Section
Age (years) 29.4
History of previous C-section 17.3 86.1
Placenta previa 0.8 71.7
Disproportion 0.2 87.3
Breech position 0.4 89.4
Twin or multiple births 2.2 66.4
Pre-eclampsia 4.8 53.6
Hypertension 9.4 48.1
Diabetes 1.0 53.5
# Physicians 3,725
# Births 1,320,817
Notes: The table shows summary statistics of the childbirth data obtained from all hospital admis-
sions in New York State over 2010-2015. The sample is restricted to physicians who have performed
at least one C-section and at least one vaginal delivery in the time period.
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics of the New York data set. The average C-
section rate in New York is 34%. The rate is a little high because the sample excludes
births delivered by family practitioners who do not perform C-section surgeries. The
mean frequency of any major complication from births in New York is 12.7%. The
maternal complication rate is 6.1%, and this includes hemorrhage, infections, and
death. The fetal complication rate is 7.1%, and this includes hemorrhage, infec-
tions, fetal distress, trauma, and death. These rates are broadly in line with the
complication rates in New Jersey (Currie and MacLeod, 2017).
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Figure 2.2.1: Histograms Showing the Number of C-sections (Left) and Vaginal
Deliveries (Right) by Physicians in New York State, 2010-2015
The average patient age in the New York sample is 29 years old. 17% of the
patients have a history of previous C-section. Among these patients, 86% received a
C-section, which is slightly lower than the national average of 91% in 2010 (Caughey,
Cahill, Guise, Rouse, of Obstetricians, Gynecologists, et al., 2014). Other patient
conditions, such as placenta previa and pre-eclampsia, are rarer, but are highly
associated with receiving a C-section surgery.
Figure 2.2.1 plots two histograms showing the total number of C-sections (left)
and vaginal deliveries (right) performed by New York State physicians in 2010-2015.
More than 2,000 physicians have performed fewer than 36 C-sections (first bin) in
my sample, and 55 physicians performed more than 1,000 C-sections (not shown).
The distribution looks similar for vaginal deliveries. More than 1,400 physicians have
fewer than 36 vaginal deliveries (first bin). 416 physicians have performed more than
1,000 vaginal deliveries.
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2.3 Empirical Specification
I estimate the following OLS:
Ci,t = αi + β1Si,t−1 ∗ Ci,t−1 + β2Si,t−1 + β3Ci,t−1 + β4Xi,t + β5Xi,t−1 + i,t
Ci,t is an indicator that equals 1 if physician i performs a C-section on patient
t. Si,t−1 is an indicator that equals 1 if physician i’s previous patient t’s childbirth
was successfully administered without any major maternal or fetal complication (see
Section 2.4.1). The regression includes physician fixed effects, αi, and controls for
patients t and t− 1, denoted by vectors Xi,t and Xi,t−1, respectively. The standard
errors are clustered at the physician level.
Xi,t contains the following key patient characteristics: patient t’s age; an indicator
for 40 years or older; dummies for race; a history of previous C-section; placenta
previa; disproportion; breech position; multiple birth; pre-eclampsia; hypertension;
diabetes; day-of-week of the procedure; month; year; and hospital fixed effects.
The coefficient of interest is β1. It is interpreted as the percentage point change in
the C-section rate following a successful C-section, conditional on the set of controls
included in the model. β1 = 0 would be consistent with a physician who decides the
treatment solely based on the medical conditions of the patient, as recommended
by standard medical guidelines (Caughey, Cahill, Guise, Rouse, of Obstetricians,
Gynecologists, et al., 2014; Betran, Torloni, Zhang, and Gu¨lmezoglu, 2016). β1 > 0
would be consistent with hot-hand behavior. That is, physicians increase the C-
section rate after a successful C-section because of a belief that a subsequent C-
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section is more likely to be successful. This behavioral response could be optimal if
physicians actually have a hot hand; otherwise, it would imply a bias.
Because I include physician fixed effects, the identification comes from within-
physician variations. Broadly speaking, the identifying assumption is that condi-
tional on a set of controls I use, the patients treated after a successful C-section are
similar to those who are not.3 More precisely, the identifying assumption is that
physicians believe that patients are drawn from the same distribution, independent
of whether the previous delivery was a successful C-section.
In Section 2.4.4 I discuss possible ways in which the identifying assumption may
be violated. For example, physicians may schedule a C-section after an “easy” C-
section. This would imply that patients in the treatment group will have higher
C-section risk than the control group, and as a result β1 would be biased upwards.
One approach to address this problem is to consider only weekends and holidays,
for which deliveries are generally not scheduled. Another approach is to drop from
the sample multiple C-sections performed by a physician in a day. The results from
both approaches suggest that endogenous scheduling of C-sections is unlikely to be
driving the main results.
3The latter category includes previous unsuccessful C-section, and previous vaginal deliveries
(successful or unsuccessful).
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Test for the Hot-Hand
The medical guidelines recommend that treatment decisions should depend on the
conditions of the patient alone (Caughey, Cahill, Guise, Rouse, of Obstetricians,
Gynecologists, et al., 2014; Betran, Torloni, Zhang, and Gu¨lmezoglu, 2016). However,
if physicians have a hot hand, then it may be in the patients’ best interest for
treatment decisions to be influenced by whether the physician has a hot hand. More
specifically, if a physician is more likely to succeed in performing a C-section after a
successful C-section, or if she is less likely to succeed in performing a vaginal delivery
after a successful C-section, it might be optimal for her to temporarily increase the
C-section rate in response to this hot hand.
I find no evidence of a hot hand in performing obstetrical procedures. Table 2.2
shows estimates from two regressions, where the dependent variable is an indicator
for a successful procedure. Column 1 focuses on C-section deliveries and shows that a
prior successful C-section is not positively associated with the probability of success
of a subsequent C-section. Similarly, Column 2 focuses on vaginal deliveries, and I
find that a prior success performing a C-section is not significantly associated with
the probability of success of a subsequent vaginal delivery.
2.4.2 Test for the Hot-Hand Bias
This section explores whether physicians’ decision to perform a C-section is associ-
ated with whether the previous delivery was a successful C-section.
30
Table 2.2: Test for the Hot-Hand (Childbirth)
(1) (2)
Dep Var = Success C-section Vaginal Delivery
Previous delivery was -0.001 -0.001
C-section * success (0.004) (0.002)
Previous delivery was a success 0.002 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002)
Previous delivery was a C-section 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.002)
Controls Y Y
Mean of Dep Var 0.85 0.88
# Births 451,132 869,685
# Physicians 3,722 3,667
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table tests whether physicians exhibit a hot hand
when performing obstetrical procedures. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the
procedure (C-section in Column 1; vaginal delivery in Column 2) is completed successfully, without
major maternal or fetal complications. The explanatory variable of interest is the interaction term,
which equals 1 if the physician’s previous delivery was a successful C-section. Standard errors are
clustered at the player level.
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In Table 2.3, Column 1 shows regression estimates using the full analysis sample,
and controlling for physician fixed effects, hospital fixed effects, as well as dummies
to control for the day-of-week, month, and year of the procedure. After a successful
C-section, the C-section rate increases by 1.1 ppts. A previous successful vaginal
delivery is negatively associated with the C-section rate, but it is not significant at
the 5% level. The C-section rate appears to be positively associated with having
performed a C-section previously.
In Column 2, I include patient conditions for the current (t) and previous (t− 1)
patients. The estimated coefficient of interest is smaller: after a successful C-section,
the C-section rate increases by 0.7 ppts (p = 0.02). This corresponds to a 2%
increase from the mean C-section rate of 34%. Whether the previous delivery was
successful, or whether it was a C-section, are both not significantly associated with
the subsequent C-section rate.
If the estimated effect is indeed because of a belief in the hot hand, the effect
should primarily be driven by physicians whose previous delivery was recent. For
example, a hot hand belief is a plausible explanation if the physician has performed
a successful C-section yesterday, but less plausible if the C-section was more than,
say, two weeks ago.
Column 3 restricts the sample to childbirths in which the physician’s previous
delivery was less than two days ago. The sample size drops to about half: 738,431
births and 3,230 physicians. The point estimate for the interaction term is slightly
larger: after a recent successful C-section (less than two days ago), the C-section
rate increases by 0.9 ppt (3%) (p = 0.012).
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Table 2.3: Test for the Hot-Hand Bias (Childbirth)
(1) (2) (3)
Dep Var = C-section Full Sample Full Sample Subsample
Previous delivery was 0.011*** 0.007** 0.009**
C-section * success (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Previous delivery was a success -0.004* -0.002 -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Previous delivery was a C-section 0.010*** 0.004 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Physician FE, Hospital FE Y Y Y
Day-of-week FE, Month FE, Year FE Y Y Y
Patient characteristics (Xi,t, Xi,t−1) Y Y
Constant 0.254*** 0.117*** 0.105***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Mean of Dep Var 0.34 0.34 0.32
# Physicians 3,725 3,725 3,230
# Births 1,320,817 1,320,817 738,431
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table tests whether the decision to perform
C-section is related to having previously performed a successful C-section. The dependent variable
is an indicator that equals 1 if the physician performs C-section on the current patient. The
explanatory variable of interest is the interaction term, which equals 1 if the physician’s previous
delivery was a successful C-section. This is a proxy for having a hot hand. Column 1 does not include
patient characteristics. Column 2 is the preferred model, with patient characteristics included as
controls. Column 3 restricts the sample to deliveries where the physician’s previous delivery was
less than two days ago. Standard errors are clustered at the player level.
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Figure 2.4.1: The Effect of Previous Successful Surgery on C-section Rate (New
York)
Next, I add 6 additional lags and 7 leads of the three main explanatory vari-
ables, as well as controls for the 13 patients, to the main regression shown in Column
2. Figure 2.4.1 plots the 14 estimated coefficients for the interaction term, with
95% confidence intervals. The x-axis shows the number of deliveries since a suc-
cessful C-section, and the y-axis shows the percentage point effect on the C-section
rate. Negative x correspond to coefficients for leads, and positive x correspond to
coefficients for lags. The point estimates for leads are a little noisy, but none are
statistically significant at the 5% level. Immediately after a successful C-section, the
C-section rate increases by 0.8 ppt (p = 0.018), but the effect does not persist and
diminishes quickly for longer lags.
34
Table 2.4: Robustness Checks (Childbirth)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep Var = C-section Ever CS Never CS Weekends Weekdays
Previous delivery was -0.008 0.008*** 0.010 0.006*
C-section * success (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Controls Y Y Y Y
p-value for difference 0.009 0.291
in coefficients
Mean of Dep Var 0.86 0.23 0.26 0.37
# Physicians 3,282 3,693 3,400 3,701
# Births 228,622 1,092,195 286,481 1,034,336
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table conducts two robustness checks. The
dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the physician performs C-section on the current
patient. The explanatory variable of interest is the interaction term, which equals 1 if the physician’s
previous delivery was a successful C-section. Columns 1 and 2 test the prediction that the effect
diminishes for patients who have a history of previous C-section (“Ever CS”). Columns 3 and 4 test
the prediction that the hot-hand bias is larger during weekends than during weekdays. Standard
errors are clustered at the player level.
2.4.3 Robustness Checks
In this section I conduct several robustness checks. First, I restrict the analysis to a
subsample of mothers with a history of having had a previous C-section. The idea is
that the hot state of the physician should have weak or no influence on the method of
delivery for these patients. A majority of these patients schedule a C-section ahead
of time, and those who do not tend to have a preference for a vaginal birth after a
C-section. In both cases, the physician’s previous surgical success is unlikely to have
an effect on the treatment decision.
In Column 1 of Table 2.4, I find a non-significant negative effect among mothers
with a history of previous C-section (“Ever CS”). By contrast, the estimated effect
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is positive and significant in the subsample of mothers who never had a C-section
before (Column 2). The two coefficients are statistically different from each other
(p = 0.009).
Next, I test the prediction that hot-hand bias is likely to be larger during weekends
than during weekdays. This is because the bias cannot affect treatment decisions
for C-sections that are planned ahead of time. C-sections are rarely planned during
weekends, and so the estimated effect may be larger than during weekdays where
there is a mix of planned and unplanned deliveries. In Column 3, the point estimate
is slightly larger for weekends, but the difference is not statistically significant.
2.4.4 Discussion of Mechanisms
To summarize, I find that a previous successful C-section is associated with a 2%
increase in the subsequent C-section rate. The effect is not persistent beyond the
immediate delivery after a successful C-section. It is consistent with a hot hand belief,
that is, a physician is more likely to perform a C-section right after a successful C-
section because of a belief that a subsequent C-section is more likely to succeed. I
also find some weak but suggestive indication that a successful vaginal delivery is
negatively associated with the physician’s subsequent C-section rate. If true, this
would be consistent with a hot hand belief in performing vaginal deliveries.
Since treatment decisions normatively should depend on the conditions of the
patient alone, standard explanations are generally less consistent with the results.
For example, I find no empirical evidence that physicians exhibit a hot hand in
performing obstetrical procedures.
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The fact that the estimated hike in C-section rate is not persistent at all helps
rule out several alternative mechanisms. For example, a reasonable learning process
– Bayesian or otherwise – would have a more persistent effect on the subsequent
C-section rate. Likewise, salience effects or a defensive response to malpractice fears
would also generate more persistent effects. For example, Shurtz (2013) find a 4%
discontinuous jump in the C-section rate that persists after the physician has made
a medical error.
Another possible mechanism is a belief in luck reversals (Rabin and Vayanos,
2010; Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue, 2016). After a successful delivery, the physician
might believe that the next childbirth is less likely to be successful, and as a result
perform C-sections as a defensive measure. This could explain why the C-section
rate increases following a successful C-section, but it would also suggest that the
C-section rate should increase following a successful vaginal delivery. In fact, I find
weak evidence of the opposite effect.
Another possibility is that physicians endogenously schedule C-sections together
in a way that would create an upward bias in the estimate. For example, physi-
cians may have a tendency to schedule a C-section after an “easy” C-section. To
address this possibility, I have identified 129,398 C-sections that correspond to mul-
tiple C-sections performed by a physician in a day. These are likely candidates for
endogenous scheduling. When I re-estimate the baseline regression without these po-
tentially endogenously-scheduled C-sections, the point estimate for the interaction
term remains intact at 0.7 ppts (p = 0.014).
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper finds a small but significant increase in the C-section rate if the physician
has previously performed a C-section successfully. The model controls for physician
fixed effects and a large set of observable medical conditions of the patient to proxy
for when a C-section is likely to maximize patient’s welfare. The evidence is most
consistent with hot-hand bias. The identified hike in the C-section rate is not per-
sistent, which is inconsistent with alternative explanations such as malpractice fears
and Bayesian learning process that predict more persistent effects.
The economic consequences of hot-hand bias in obstetrics are large. Suppose that
the identified 2% increase in the C-section rate is entirely unnecessary.4 Generalizing
to the US, this would create 8,000 unnecessary C-sections each year. According
to the New York hospital data, a C-section is about $7,000 more expensive than
natural birth, which sums up to $55 million in unnecessary health-care costs. In
addition, mothers who receive unnecessary C-sections are more likely to receive C-
section again in the future. I estimate this additional cost to be $10 million, bringing
the total estimate to $65 million in unnecessary health-care costs per year in the US.
This estimate is conservative, because it excludes disutility from receiving a major
abdominal surgery and potential long-term health risks associated with C-sections
for low-risk births.
4The assumption is that decision errors only occur in one direction where the mothers who do
not medically require a C-section can receive unnecessary C-section, but mothers who medically
require a C-section will always receive a C-section. This assumption is based on the evidence that
C-sections are only medically necessary for about 20% of the patients (Gibbons, Beliza´n, Lauer,
Betra´n, Merialdi, Althabe, et al., 2010; Molina, Weiser, Lipsitz, Esquivel, Uribe-Leitz, Azad, Shah,
Semrau, Berry, Gawande, et al., 2015), much lower than the current rate of 32% in the U.S. (Martin,
Hamilton, Osterman, Driscoll, and Mathews, 2017).
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It is challenging to think about policy interventions that can mitigate the hot-
hand bias. Will telling physicians about the bias reduce it? Will showing electronic
reminders of the medical guidelines for when to perform C-sections effective in mit-
igating the hot-hand bias? One possible approach is to conduct an incentivized lab
experiment with resident physicians. The experiment could simulate the medical
decision-making process by presenting the medical students with patient records,
asking them to make treatment decisions, and showing them the outcome. I could
then implement various interventions in the lab to test if they reduce the hot-hand
bias. Given that I find a small effect in the field, it would be important to check if
there will be enough power to identify the effects of interventions in a lab setting.
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Chapter 3
Sleep and Health: Evidence from
Daylight Saving Time (with
Nicolas Ziebarth)
3.1 Introduction
Sleep deprivation is becoming a major public health concern in many developed
countries around the world. The global sleep-aid market is growing rapidly with
an estimated size of $80 billion in 2020 (Persistent Market Research, 2015). The
United States alone counts 40 million sleeping pill prescriptions per year and about
2800 “sleep labs” exist (CDC, 2013; DiSalvo, 2015). Hillman, Murphy, Antic, and
Pezzullo (2006) estimate the economic costs of sleeplessness at almost one percent
of GDP.
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There is rich medical literature on the relationship between sleep and health.
Numerous studies have documented positive associations between sleep deprivation,
poor health, and decreased cognitive ability, but it remains unclear whether this
link represents a causal relationship (Moore, Adler, Williams, and Jackson, 2002;
Taheri, Lin, Austin, Young, and Mignot, 2004; Mullington, Haack, Toth, Serrador,
and Meier-Ewert, 2009; Killgore, 2010). Banks and Dinges (2007) provide a com-
prehensive review of the behavioral and physiological effects of inadequate sleep,
including experimental evidence with healthy adult laboratory participants. They
conclude that restricting sleep below an individual’s optimal could cause a range of
neurobehavioral deficits.
Fewer studies have investigated the role of sleep in the economics literature.
Biddle and Hamermesh (1990) show that increased labor market activities reduce
sleep duration. Hamermesh, Myers, and Pocock (2008) exploit television schedules
and time use data to demonstrate how time zones affect market work and sleep in
the US. Giuntella and Mazzonna (2017) also exploit US time zones to show in a
geographic Regression Discontinuity Design that sleep deprivation can lead to poor
health and obesity. Moreover, Gibson and Shrader (2018) identify positive wage
returns to sleep. Billari, Giuntella, and Stella (2017) exploit the rollout of high-
speed internet access in Germany and show that DSL access reduces both sleep
duration and sleep satisfaction.
This paper investigates the short-term causal effect of getting additional sleep
on health. We exploit the quasi-experimental nature of a regulation that has been
affecting the sleep pattern of more than one billion people in 70 countries around the
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globe: Daylight Saving Time (DST). It is the practice of setting clocks forward by
one hour in spring and backward by one hour in fall. The original DST rationale was
to save energy. Today, all countries in the European Union, the great majority of
the US states and Canadian provinces, as well as 40 other countries such as Mexico,
Chile, Israel, and Iran observe DST.
Our identification strategy focuses on the time shift in the fall when the clocks
“fall back” and exogenously add one additional hour at night. The main idea is
that this extension at night induces people to sleep more. Indeed, using a large
US survey, we find that people report sleeping significantly more following the time
shift. Moreover, we find a significant reduction in the share of people who report
having unintentionally fallen asleep during the day. We then combine large survey
and administrative hospital data to identify the health benefits of getting more sleep
at the population level.
We use two large datasets that complement each other: (a) The US Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), which records sleep and self-reported
health and allows us to study mild and subjective health effects; and (b) The Ger-
man Hospital Census, which records all hospitalizations and allows us to study objec-
tive health effects. Both datasets together provide evidence from the most populous
American and European country over a decade. Both datasets carry large numbers
of observations – 3.4 million interviews from the U.S. and 160 million hospital admis-
sions from Germany. The large sample sizes are crucial to control for seasonal and
weekday confounders while maintaining enough statistical power to precisely identify
health effects at a daily level.
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Our findings show consistent evidence that both subjective and objective health
measures significantly improve for about four days after getting more sleep. The
BRFSS data show that the share of US citizens reporting “excellent health” increases
from 19 to 20% between days 1 to 4 after the time shift. In addition, hospital
admissions decrease significantly, and this effect also persists for about four days. For
example, hospitalizations due to cardiovascular diseases decrease by ten admissions
per day per one million population. We then discuss alternative mechanisms through
which the DST transition might affect health, and show that these are unlikely to
drive our findings.
The next section briefly describes the data. Section 3.3 outlines the empirical
methodology. Section 3.4 presents and discusses the findings and Section 3.5 con-
cludes.
3.2 Datasets
3.2.1 The US Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS)
The first dataset measures sleep duration and subjective health effects in the general
population. The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) is a large,
annual telephone survey of US adults aged 18 and above, administered by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The survey began in 1984 with fifteen
participating states; by 1996, all 51 US states participated in the survey. It covers
an extensive set of self-reported health and also sleep. It is, by design, representative
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Figure 3.2.1: Sample Selection of Main Models–Extracting 6 Weeks around DST
Change
of state populations. We focus on the period from 2001 to 2010 which includes
more than 3.4 million survey responses in total. However, as illustrated by Figure
3.2.1, our main sample extracts six weeks around the time shift and counts 421,101
observations.
The BRFSS includes demographics such as age, sex, race, and marital status, as
well as education and employment status.
Construction of Main Dependent Variables
First, we use the standard self-assessed health (SAH) question: “Would you say
that in general your health is ?” The majority of respondents report their general
health to be either very good (32%) or good (30%), and about 19% report excellent
general health. Less than 6% of the population report poor general health. From
this, we construct two binary dependent variables: (a) Excellent health, and (b) fair
or poor health.
Second, we use two sleep measures. Responses to the following question are
integers between 0 and 24: “On average, how many hours of sleep do you get in a
24-hour period? Think about the time you actually spend sleeping or napping, not
just the amount of sleep you think you should get.” We interpret the answers as a
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good measure of actual sleep duration. It is worth noting that the question does
not explicitly ask for the duration of sleep last night, but instead the responses will
reflect average sleep in the recent past. Hence, our estimate on sleep duration is likely
downward biased and a lower bound. Thus, it provide a conservative test whether
people sleep more when clocks are set back in fall.
We also use responses to the following question to measure tiredness during the
day: “During the past 30 days, for about how many days did you find yourself un-
intentionally falling asleep during the day?” We convert the responses into a binary
variable indicating the share of people who unintentionally fell asleep. On average,
35% of the US population report unintentionally falling asleep.
Finally, in robustness checks and falsification testes, we use information on whether
respondents received a flu shot in the past calendar year, and whether they exercise.
Daylight Saving Time in the US
In the United States, DST ends on the first Sunday in November. The time change
occurs at 2am, where the clocks are set back to 1am, effectively extending the night
by one hour. Table 3.1 shows the dates of the time shift from 2000-2010. DST is
observed by most states in the US. As of 2018, the states that do not observe are
Arizona, Hawaii, and overseas territories. Indiana only began to observe DST in
2006. Our empirical strategy only uses states that observe DST.
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Table 3.1: Date of Fall DST Transition in Germany and the US
Year DST Fall US DST Fall Germany
2000 10/29/2000 10/29/2000
2001 10/28/2001 10/28/2001
2002 10/27/2002 10/27/2002
2003 10/26/2003 10/26/2003
2004 10/31/2004 10/31/2004
2005 10/30/2005 10/30/2005
2006 10/29/2006 10/29/2006
2007 11/4/2007 10/28/2007
2008 11/2/2008 10/26/2008
2009 11/1/2009 10/25/2009
2010 11/7/2010 10/31/2010
3.2.2 German Hospital Admissions Census
The second dataset provides objective health measures. The dataset comprises all
German hospital admissions from 2000 to 2008. By law, German hospitals are re-
quired to submit depersonalized information on every single hospital admission. The
16 German states collect these information and the German Federal Statistical Of-
fice provides restricted data access for researchers. Germany has about 82 million
inhabitants and about 17 million hospital admission per year. To obtain the working
dataset, we aggregate the admission-level data on the daily county level and then
normalize admissions per 100,000 population.
The data include information on age and gender, the day of admission, the county
of residence as well as the diagnosis in form of the 10th revision of the International
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10) code.
As with BRFSS, our working dataset focuses on the six weeks centered around
the time shift (Figure 3.2.1). This main sample has 336,604 county-day observations
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over 9 years. We leave the data at the county-level and do not further aggregate up
to the national level for a few reasons. First, this allows us to stratify the effects by
county characteristics and weather and pollution conditions. Another reason is that
we lose statistical power when aggregating up to a time series at the national level.
Construction of Main Dependent Variables
Using the information on primary diagnosis, we generate the following dependent
variables: All cause admission rate. On a given day, we observe 59.77 hospital
admissions per 100,000 population. However, the rate varies substantially and the
standard deviation is 25.73.
By extracting the ICD-10 codes I00-I99—diseases of the circulatory system—we
generate Cardiovascular admission rate. This is the single most important subgroup
of admissions—9.53 admissions per 100,000 population account for 16% of all admis-
sions. Extracting the codes I20 and I21, the Heart attack rate is 1.59 admissions per
100,000 population.
Finally, we generate the injury rate (V01-X59) as well as the respiratory (J00-
J99), metabolic (E00-E90), neoplastic (C00-D48), and infectious admission rate (A00-
B99). We also test for changes in suicide attempts (T14) and drug overdosing (T40)
per 1 million population.
Daylight Saving Time in Germany
In Germany, DST ends on the last Sunday of October in all German states (Table
3.1). The time change occurs on 3am where the clocks are set back to 2am. Again,
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for the main analysis, we restrict our sample to six weeks around the time change
(Figure 3.2.1).
3.3 Empirical Specification
Our identification strategy relies on sleep extensions created by DST transitions in
the fall. These occur on different dates each year. Our large datasets allow us
to comprehensively control for seasonal confounders, weekday effects, and yet to
precisely estimate health effects. Our preferred empirical specification identifies the
effects at the daily level. We also estimate models at the weekly level to capture
medium-term and potential intertemporal substitution effects.
3.3.1 Main Specification
Our preferred specification employs daily dummies around the DST time shift in the
fall:
yid = β0+β1DSTid+X
′
idγ+V acationd+φm∗δt+DOW ∗φm+t+t2+µs+id (3.3.1)
Where yid is the health outcome variable using the German Hospital Census
(BRFSS), for county (individual) i on day d. DST is a vector containing fifteen
daily dummies around the DST time shift.
Equation (3.3.1) includes controls that net out seasonal and weekday confounders.
These are crucial when using high-frequency data within the DST context. For
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example, hospital admissions decrease on Sundays and also on national holidays
(Witte, Grobbee, Bots, and Hoes, 2005). V acationd controls for public holidays and
the Halloween.
Due to the relevance of day-of-the-week (DOW) effects, we additionally interact
DOW with month fixed effects (DOW ∗ φm). This is important as Sundays in
November may be systematically different from Sundays in September. For example,
in our data, relative to Sundays, hospital admissions almost double on Mondays and
this effect varies over the months of a year. Because DST transitions are always on
Sundays, it is crucial to net out DOW effects by month of the year.
Our model also includes month-year fixed effects (φm∗δt) and linear and quadratic
time trends (t+ t2). However, the findings are robust to replacing month-year fixed
effects with separate month and year fixed effects and omitting time trends. In addi-
tion, Equation (3.3.1) corrects for county-level or individual-level socio-demographics
(X ′idγ) and persistent differences across states or counties (µs).
Because it is unlikely that admission rates are either independent over time or
across space, we correct the standard errors, id, by applying two-way clustering
across counties and over time (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2011). When using
the independently drawn and representative observations of the BRFSS, we cluster
standard errors at the date level. All BRFSS regressions are probability weighted.
3.3.2 Identification
The key idea of our identification strategy is that the running variable is time; and
that the DST transition generates the treatment. DST transitions are arguably ex-
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ogenous to individuals because humans cannot influence time. Our main specification
de-trends the outcome variables using DOW-month and month-year fixed effects, in
addition to socio-demographic controls. We also disentangle weekday and seasonal
effects from specific events such as vacation days or national holidays. The richness
of our data still allows us to obtain precise estimates at the daily level. However,
we also compare the day-to-day short-term effect of the change in time to the net
effect on a weekly basis. Moreover, in effect heterogeneity specifications that test for
behavioral mechanisms, we stratify the results by ambient climatic conditions such
as temperatures, hours of sunshine, and pollution.
Sample Selection and Definition of Treatment and Control Groups
As illustrated in Figure 3.2.1, we restrict our main sample to three weeks before
and three weeks after the time shift. However, the results are robust to including
all 52 weeks of the year. The findings are also robust to assigning all three post-
transition weeks to the “treatment group.” Doing this yields results that are similar
to a standard Regression Discontinuity design where the post-treatment outcomes
are compared to that of the pre-treatment, conditional on all covariates, see for
example Doleac and Sanders (2015).
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 The Effect of Time Shift on Sleep
First, we use BRFSS measures on sleep to provide first-stage evidence that the fall
DST time shift increases the average sleep duration in the population. In the US,
on the first Sunday of November, the clocks are set back by one hour from 2am to
1am, effectively extending night time by an hour. (In Germany, the clocks fall back
from 3am to 2am on the last Sunday of October; Table 3.1.)
Table 3.2 shows the results when we estimate Equation (3.3.1) using the BRFSS
sleep measures as outcome variables. The first two columns use self-reported hours
of sleep as the dependent variable; the last two columns use unintentionally fell
asleep as dependent variable. As discussed in Section 3.2.1, our measures capture
sleep in the recent past, not just from last night. The estimates are therefore likely
downward-biased; for us, they provide a crude affirmative test that people do sleep
more when clocks fall back.
According to column (1), on average, people sleep an additional 0.27 hours (or
about 16 minutes). This estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level. The
regression includes the same set of controls as our preferred model in Equation (3.3.1),
comprehensively netting out seasonal effects. Note that this is an average effect across
the entire population. It is likely driven by the sleep deprived. In fact, a 16-minute
increase in sleep across the entire population is consistent with a quarter of the
population sleeping one hour more.
Column (2) uses a model that measures the effect at the weekly level. Here we
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Table 3.2: Effects of Fall DST Transition on Sleep
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours of Hours of Unintentionally Unintentionally
Sleep Sleep falling asleep falling asleep
Day of 0.265*** -0.061
Transition (0.079) (0.054)
Week of 0.182*** -0.044**
Transition (0.069) (0.022)
Controls X X X X
Dep. var. mean 7.07 7.07 0.35 0.35
R2 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Observations 10,833 10,833 10,833 10,833
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the date
level. Regressions are probability-weighted. Day of Transition is an indicator variable that equals 1
if the interview is on the day of DST transition in the fall. Week of Transition is an indicator that
equals 1 if the interview is on the Sunday of DST transition or one of the following 6 days. Controls
include state fixed effects, indicator for the Halloween, day-of-week X month fixed effects, month
x year fixed effects, linear and quadratic time trends, and socioeconomic covariates. In 2009, six
states (Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Wyoming) began to include questions
about sleep in the BRFSS; this expanded to nine states in 2010 (Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, and Oregon). The column headers
describe the dependent variables used in each column; columns (1) and (2) have values between 0
and 24; columns (3) and (4) use binary measures. Each column is one model as in Equation (3.3.1).
include a dummy variable that equals 1 for the entire the week of the DST transition.
Again, we find that people sleep a statistically highly significant 0.18 hours (or 11
minutes, 2.5%) more per night (for seven nights) on the week of DST transition when
the night hours are extended.
We find corroborating evidence when we turn to self-reported measures of tired-
ness in columns (3) and (4). The estimated daily effect in column (3) is negative but
imprecisely estimated, which may be due to the noisy nature of this survey question.
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Figure 3.4.1: Effects of Fall DST Transition on Unintentionally Falling Asleep in
Past 30 Days
In column (4), where we estimate the weekly model, we find that people are 4.4
percentage points (ppts) or 12.6% less likely to report having fallen asleep in the
week of time shift. This estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Figure 3.4.1 plots the daily dummies of the vector DSTid in Equation (3.3.1)
using fell unintentionally asleep as outcome measure. Figure 3.4.1 is an event study-
type graph and plots estimates for -7, -6,. . . ,0,. . . , 6, 7 days relative to the time
shift. Note that this is not a simple descriptive graph but compares the effect in the
treatment group relative to the control group, after having netted out of seasonal
and weekday confounders (Equation (3.3.1)).
In Figure 3.4.1, despite the noisy nature of the self-reported measure, one ob-
serves a distinct four-day decrease in tiredness following the DST transition. As
we discuss below, we find very similar four-day health improvements using different
health measures from the US and Germany, such as self-reported health or hospi-
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tal admissions. We interpret this consistent pattern as reinforcing evidence for the
credibility of our identification strategy.
3.4.2 The Effect of Time Shift on Hospital Admissions
Next, we study whether hospital admissions vary significantly as a result of the time
change. Table 3.2 shows that people report having significantly longer sleep on the
day and in the week of the fall transition when clocks are set back in the middle
of the night. We expect the effects to be particularly concentrated among the sleep
deprived—studies show that about ten percent of the population are permanently
sleep deprived (e.g. Knutson, Van Cauter, Rathouz, DeLeire, and Lauderdale, 2010).
Table 3.3 shows weekly admission estimates by disease groups for Germany. Each
column is one model as in Equation (3.3.1). The main regressor of interest is a dummy
indicating the week of DST transition.
Except for drug overdosing, all estimates are negative and highly significant,
mostly at the 1% level. The weekly decreases in daily admissions range from 8.3%
for the all cause admission rate (column (1)) to a similar 7.5% for cardiovascular
admissions (column (2)). Injuries decrease by almost 5% or about 2.7 per 1 mil-
lion residents. Consistent with the medical literature (Berk, Dodd, Hallam, Berk,
Gleeson, and Henry, 2008), even suicide attempts decrease by 2.76 per 100 million
residents.
Next we zoom in and plot the daily estimates of Equation (3.3.1) in event study
graphs. Figure 3.4.2 shows all cause admissions per 100,000 population and car-
diovascular admissions per 100,000 population, respectively. Despite a conservative
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Table 3.3: Effects of Fall DST Transition on Hospitalizations by Disease Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All cause Cardiovascular Heart Injury
admissions rate admissions rate attack rate admission rate
Week of -4.9556*** -0.7195*** -0.0882*** -2.7121***
Transition (1.1139) (0.1589) (0.02611) (0.6869)
Controls X X X X
Dep. var. mean 59.77 9.53 1.59 57.56
R2 0.8469 0.5675 0.1510 0.2067
Observations 336,604 336,604 336,604 336,604
(5) (6) (7)
Metabolic Suicide Drug
admissions rate attempt rate overdosing
Week of -0.1874*** -0.0276** -0.0044
Transition (0.0385) (0.0128) (0.0055)
Controls X X X
Dep. var. mean 0.32 0.09 0.32
R2 0.3095 0.0179 0.0008
Observations 336,604 336,604 336,604
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses and two-way
clustered at the county and date level. Week of Transition is an indicator variables that equals
1 if the interview date is on the DST Sunday or one of the following 6 days. Controls include
county fixed effects, vacation fixed effects, day-of-week x month fixed effects, month x year fixed
effects, linear and quadratic time trends, and socioeconomic covariates. Each column is one model
as in Equation (3.3.1). All admission rates are per 100,000 except for Injuries, Suicides and Drug
Overdosing (per 1,000,000).
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Figure 3.4.2: Effects of Fall DST Transition on Total and Cardiovascular Hospital
Admissions
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two-way clustering on the date and county-level, the census of hospital admissions
identifies even daily effects in a very precise manner.
The two event study graphs in Figure 3.4.2 show a characteristic four-day pattern
of decreases in admissions: We observe significant decreases in overall and cardio-
vascular admissions on days one to four after the time shift. The effect is most
pronounced on the Monday after the clocks are set back, and it decreases smoothly
over the next three days before it disappears on day five. The decrease for cardiovas-
cular admissions equals about 1 avoided admission per 100,000 population for four
days, or about a 10% decrease for four days.
In robustness checks, one obtains exactly the same pattern using the full sample,
heart attacks and injuries, and suicide attempts. The consistency of these patterns
for even heart attacks suggests that the decrease in admissions is not due to voluntary
behavioral responses.
We interpret the similarity of these four-day patterns as strong support for our
identification strategy. The implication is that additional sleep leads to immediate
health improvements across disease groups for people who are on the margin of being
hospitalized.
3.4.3 The Effect of Time Shift on Self-Reported Health
So far, we have seen significant reductions in hospital admissions following the time
shift. However, does more sleep also make people feel better? To address this
question, we again use the BRFSS. Using excellent health as the outcome, Figure
3.4.3 plots the coefficients of Equation (3.3.1). As above, all point estimates are
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plotted along with 90% confidence intervals.
Following the time shift, the share of people who report excellent health increases
by a statistically significant 1ppt on the Monday after the transition; and the effect
persists until Thursday. Although the estimates are naturally noisier than the hos-
pital admission estimates, we again observe the characteristic four-day pattern. In
fact, it is strikingly similar to the pattern that we find for hospital admissions in
Germany (Section 3.4.2) and our measure of tiredness (Section 3.4.1). The size of
the probability-weighted coefficients would translate into about 2.5 million marginal
Americans who report “excellent” instead of “very good” health for four days.
The results are robust to using all 52 weeks of the year and not weighting the
regressions. The pattern also remain robust when we explore movements from SAH
category three (good health) to category two (very good health).
The bottom graph of Figure 3.4.3 uses fair or poor health as outcome. Here,
maybe surprisingly, we do not find significant effects. We offer a few possible ex-
planations. First, the SAH measures are inherently noisy. For example, when we
homogenize the sample, exclude people who sleep more than 8 hours on a regular ba-
sis and re-run Equation (3.3.1), we do find significant decreases in fair or poor health
by 3.3ppt. A complementary explanation is that Americans are very optimistic about
their health which is why only 6% report poor health. It is likely that people who
“just” lack sleep do not self-categorize as being in poor health—recall that studies
find that ten percent of the population are permanently sleep deprived (Knutson,
Van Cauter, Rathouz, DeLeire, and Lauderdale, 2010). Finally, very sick respon-
dents may not be able to complete the survey (e.g., because of being hospitalized),
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Figure 3.4.3: Effects of Fall DST Transition on People Reporting Excellent and Poor
Health
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and thus may not appear in the data.
3.4.4 Could Alternative Mechanisms Explain the Health Ef-
fects?
Next we investigate whether alternative mechanisms could explain the health effects
that we find. For example, an alternative mechanism that could theoretically produce
the health benefits is the shift in ambient light from evening to morning hours. As
the clocks “fall back” by one hour, sunrise and sunset both occur at earlier times.
One could hypothesize that, because mornings get brighter earlier, people are more
likely to exercise in the morning following the transition (and less likely to exercise in
the evening). To test for this the net effect on exercising, we use a BRFSS measure
on exercising and run our standard model in Equation (3.3.1). In line with Giuntella
and Mazzonna (2017), we find no evidence that exercising changes as a result of the
time change.
A shift in ambient light can also affect traffic accidents. However, Smith (2016)
does not find that the time shift in the fall significantly affects fatalities. Moreover,
traffic accidents cannot explain why hospital admissions drop sharply across a broad
range of diseases, most of which are not related to accidents.
Another potential confounding factor could be crime. Doleac and Sanders (2015)
show that robberies decrease in the days following the DST transition in spring
(when evenings get dark later). However, they find no significant effects on crime
rates in fall. Even if there was a significant robbery effect, robberies would then
increase following the time shift in the fall (because it gets dark sooner), and thus
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have adverse health effects, opposite the prediction of our sleep mechanism.
The fall DST transition increases the length of the Sunday from 24 to 25 hours.
This may affect hospital admissions (or health survey responses) in ways unrelated
to sleep. The most plausible hypothesis is that, because the day is longer, the total
number of admissions will be higher, suggesting that we identify a lower bound.
Moreover, this mechanism cannot explain why we find persistent health effects over
four days.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper exploits the quasi-experimental nature of Daylight Saving Time (DST)
to assess whether getting more sleep during the fall transition improves population
health in the short-run. We use a large survey dataset from the US and the census of
hospital admissions from Germany over one decade. Our results provide consistent
and robust evidence across the two countries that health significantly improves for
about four days after people gain more sleep. About 2.5 million Americans sleep
significantly more following the time shift, are less likely to unintentionally fall asleep
during the day, and consider themselves to be in better subjective health. Moreover,
hospital data also show the same characteristic four-day drop in admissions in the
days following the transition. For example, cardiovascular admissions decrease by ten
admission per one million population over four days. This implies that, for people
on the margin with poor health, additional sleep and rest may prevent unwanted
health shocks. We also find similar patterns of reduced admissions for patients with
61
other diseases (which are not necessarily diagnosed on these days), but no changes
in placebo tests.
The main objective of this paper is to provide evidence for the existence of a causal
relationship between sleep and human capital. We do not intend to draw conclusions
about the overall welfare effects of Daylight Saving Time. We would also like to point
to a caveat: our reduced-form approach is well-suited for the identification of causal
and immediate intent-to-treat effects, but less suited to identify long-term effects of
sleep. The sleeping habits may affect mood, cognitive skills and health cumulatively
over time in the long run. Alternatively, it is possible that the human body is
able to adapt to (adverse) sleeping conditions. Field experiments have the power
to find answers to these questions (Tepedino, Rao, Schilbach, Schofield, and Toma,
2017). More research is necessary to better understand how improvements in sleep
quality may improve life quality, education and labor market outcomes as well as life
expectancy.
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